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In many African countries, the size of a taxpayer's personal
deduction increases with his income. Does this rule give the rich
more of a tax break than the  poor? Is a standard  (fixed) deduction
needed to allow for progressivity?  The answers may surprise
you.
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At first glance, allowing the personal deduction  although the two sets of tax rules appear to be
on income tax to increase as the taxpayer's  dii1ewnt.
income increases appears to give larger tax
breaks to the rich than to the poor.  On closer  Should a country contemplating liberaliza-
examination, this notion tums out to be false.  tion of the tax schedules simply adopt an IDTD?
As the authors of this paper leamed, each tax  The answer is not easy.  An IDTD is administra-
system with "income-dependent tax deductions"  tively simple, but its logic is not immediately
(IDTDs) is fully equivalent to a particular  transparent.  It could be seen as inequitable, and
conventonal  progressive tax system with  it could be misused.  The fixed percentage
standard deductions.  deduction could be relaxed, resulting in an
unrestricted deduction. The IDTD could also be
Consider a given conventional tax schedule  confined to one category of taxpayers, resulting
that has standard deductions and progressive tax  in a true inequity - as with discrimination
rates.  Suppose that you add a new nile to this  against the self-employed in some countries.
system that provides an additional deduction
equal to 10 percent of the taxpayer's income.  These caveats do not necessarily justify
This single reform measure has the same effect  replacing an existing IDTD with an equivalent
as a "liberalization" package consisting of (a) an  liberalization package.  A taxpaying public long
increase of about 10 percent in standard deduc-  accustomed to income-determined allowances
tions, (b) an enlargement of about 10 percen. in  may vigorously oppose such a change.  Even in
all tax brackets, and (c) a reduction of about 10  an imperfect IDTD system, it may bu Jtrategic-
percent on all marginal tax rates. The full  ally preferable to conrect the aberrations rather
equivalence of the two options may not be  than eliminate the IDTDs and risk a tax revolt.
obvious - it was not to the authors.
One implication for comparative tax re-
In other words, a tax system with IDTDs is  search is that the tax schedule of a country that
not less equitable than a conventional system  uses IDTDs should not be compared directly
with standard deductions. They are equivalent.  with a conventional tax schedule in another
The liberalization package in the example is  country.  Existing cross-country work on tax
typical in 1980s' tax reforms yet equity has not  deductions and marginal tax rates generally fails
emerged as an issue.  An equivalent tax reform  to recognize that IDTDs invalidate a straightfor-
option consisting of an IDTD rule, therefore,  ward comparison. To make the two systems
should not be a cause for concem.  Substituting  comparable, a transformation like the one sug-
an IDTD rule for a liberalization package would  gestzd in the paper is needed.
leave the tax system effectively unchanged,
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1.  In  many  African  countries,  the  amount  of personal  deduction  for
income  tax  purposes  increases  with the  taxpayer's  income. (This  practice
henceforth  will  be referred  to  as "income-dependent  tax  dedk.ctions"  or
IDTDs.)  This  rule  is  unconventional  in  many  respects. First,  contrary  to
the  common  practice  across  countries,  it  allows  the  amount  of personal
deduction  to  vary  from  one  taxpayer  to  another. Second,  the  variation  in
deductions  does  not  depend  on objective  indicators  of  needs,  such  as the
number  of dependents  in  a household. Third,  whereas  a fixed  or standard
deduction  is  meant  to  provide  full  or partial  tax  relief  to the  poorest
income  group,  the  IDTD  rule  provides  tax  reductions  for  everybody  across
the  board.
2.  To a tax  analyst  accustomed  to  conventional  rules,  the  dependency
of personal  deduction  on income  appears  to  be a dubious  proposition.  To
begin  with,  there  seems  to  be no  point  in  providing  very large  tax  relief
for  individuals  with  very  high income,  as is the  case  under  the  IDTD  rule.
An inverse  relationship  between  income  and  personal  deduction  would  appear
more  desirable  than  a direct  relationship,  for  at least  more  revenue  could
be raised  with  no objectionable  hardship  created. Moreover,  when income-
dependent  tax  deductions  are  combined  with  a  progressive  rate  structure,
the  distribution  of tax  savings  across  individuals  becomes  highly
inequitable.  As income  rises,  both  personal  deductions  and  marginal  tax
rates  increase,  and  therefore  tax  savings  are  amplified.
3.  These  concerns  about  IDTDs  are  rooted  in traditional  income  tax
analysis. At the  heart  of the  concerns  is  the  notion  that  a  particular
provision  implies  more  benefits  for  the  rich  than  the  rest  of society. No-2
specific  conflict  with  horizontal  or  vertical  equity  is  cited. A very
similar  issue  well-known  in  the  income  tax  literature  is  the  comparison  of
tax  deductions  and  tax  credit. 1 It is  typically  demonstrated  that  tax
credit  is  a better  instrument  of tax  relief  for  the  poor. According  to the
standard  argument,  the  deduction  method  allows  tax  savings  to  rise in
proportion  to  marginal  tax  rates  whereas  the  tax  credit  method  creates  no
such  discrepancy.  An illustration  of this  argument  is  given  in the  Annex.
4.  The  objections  against  IDTDs  are  based  on relatively  stringent
equity  conditions  Less  severe  requirements  are  generally  met  by the  IDTD
rule.  Consider,  for  example,  the  vertical  equity  test. It can  be shown
that  the  effective  tax  rate  (defined  as total  taxes  paid  divided  by gross
income)  under  IDTDs  does  not  fall  as income  increases.  Indeed,  any  desired
degree  of  progressivity  can  be achieved  through  appropriate  graduation  of
tax  rates. Moreover,  IDTDs  create  no tax  discrepancy  for  individuals  with
the  same  level  of income  and  therefore  satisfies  the  horizontal  equity
requirement.  Finally,  IDTDs  may  be used  to  exclude  the  poor  of any  chosen
income  range  from  the  tax  net. This  objective  can  be accomplished  by
choosing  the  appropriate  level  of the  minimum  deduction  available  to  all
taxpayers.
5.  Nevertheless,  to the  traditional  tax  analyst,  a tax  system  with  a
fixed  or standard  tax  deduction  (STD)  is  superior,  at least  on equity
grounds,  to  one  with  IDTDs. Under  STDs,  there  is  a limit  placed  on the
amount  of tax  relief  claimed  by those  with  high incomi. No such  limit
exists  under  IDTDs. Moreover,  STDs  do not  produce  sharply  divergent  tax
savings  as do IDTDs. A tax  reform  involving  a replacement  of IDTDs  by STDs
1/  See,  for  example,  Lewis  (1984),  pp. 65-76.would  therefore  be desirable. Such  a reform  would  improve  equity  and, if
desired,  raise  more revenue  through  appropriate  choice  of the  deduction
level.
6.  These  conclusions  are  incorrect,  however. As the  analysis  below
will  demonstrate,  the  traditional  tax  analyst  is  misguided  in  his
assessments.  IDTDs  are  in fact  equivalent  to STDs. There  exists,  for
example,  a  perfectly  conventional  tax  system  (with  STDs  among  others)  that
produces  for  all  taxpayers  exactly  the  same  tax  liabilities  as the  existing
tax  system  of Ghana  or  Nigeria. Tax  rates  and  brackets  associated  with the
equivalent  conventional  systems  will  differ  from  the  existing  ones,
however. These  results  are  somewhat  surprising  and  may serve  as a reminder
against  the  tendency  to  make  quick  judgements  on unconventional  practices
and  against  the  inclination  to  fall  back  on the  familiar.
II.  EXAMPLES  OF UNEOUAL  DEDUCTIONS
7.  Systematic  use  of income-dependent  tax  deductions  (IDTDs)  is  found
in  Ghana  and  Nigeria. On the  surface,  deduction  rules  in the  two  countries
appear  to  be very  different. Nigeria  has  a relatively  simple  rule  in  which
deduction  is the  sum  of  a fixed  amount  (of  dependent  allowances)  and  a
percentage  of income. The  relationship  is immediately  discernible:
D  a  +  (1)
where  D  personal  deduction
Y - income
8.  The  case  of Ghana  is  more  complex. Personal  relief  consists  of a
standard  deduction  under  the  tax  schedule  and  tax-free  allowances,  which
vary  across  individuals.  The  amount  of tax-free  allowances  permissible  by- 4-
law,  however,  is  systematically  related  to income. And  hence  the  general
relationship  in (1)  also  holds  for  the  Ghanaian  tax  system. Figure  1
shows  the  particular  functional  relations  for  the  two  countries.
A.  The  Case  of Ghana
9.  The  Ghanaian  tax  code  recognizes  two  distinct  forms  of earned
income: basic  salary  and  essential  allowances.  The  basic  salary  is
subject  to tax  and  serves  as  a benchmark  for  a  variety  of financial
calculations  including  pension-fund  contribution  and  social  security
taxes. The  allowances  are  meant  to  defray  the  taxpayer's  living  expenses
and  are  not  taxable. Only  salaried  workers  may  claim  tax-free  allowances,
however;  the  self-employed  may  deduct  business  expenses,  but once  income
is  determined,  no further  allowances  are  granted. 2 The  tax  schedule
looks  very  much  like  a conventional  system,  with  a standard  deduction  and
progressive  tax  rates,  but it  applies  only  to  basic  salaries. A taxpayer
is entitled  to deduct  from  his  total  income  (a)  all  the  allowances  and (b)
a standard  deduction  given  in  the  tax  schedule.
10.  During  the  calendar  year  1988,  the  following  tax  schedule  was in
effect:
Bracket  (C)3  Tax  Rate (%)
First 24,0004  Nil
Next  30,000  5
Next  30,000  10
Next  225,000  20
Next  225,000  30
Next  225,000  40
Next  225,000  50
Over  984,000  55
/  This  rule  discriminates  against  the  self-employed  and  violates  the
principle  of  horizontal  equity. The  current  impact  of the
discrimination  may  not  be significant,  however,  since  there  is  lictle
control  at  present  over  the  types  and  scale  of  business  expenses
claimed. As the  audit  capacity  improves,  however,  such  a rule  would
become  a  more  serious  cause  for  concern.
J/  The  average  official  (auction)  exchange  rate  in  1988  was  C 235/US$
i/ The  amount  could  in  principle  be adjusted  for  dependents,  but in
practice  no adjustments  were  allowed.-5 
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11.  In  addition,  the  following  guidelines  on  tax-free
compensation  were  used:
(1)  housing  allowance  up  to  20%  of  basic  salary
(2)  bonus,  up  to  158  of  basic  salary
(3)  transport  allowance,  no  limit  in  19885
(4)  canteen  allowance,  no limit  in  19885
(5)  car  maintenance  allowance,  up  to  C  30,000  p.a.
(6)  leave  allowanco,  up to  C  1,500  p.a.
(7)  night  duty  allowance,  no  limit.
The  amount  of allowances  recoived  by  an  employee  thus  depends  on  his  basic
salary  (items  1  and  2)  and  on  the  types  of  fixed  allowances  granted.  For
instance,  in  1988,  low-level  civil  servants  received  about  C 35,000  in
tax-free  allowances,  whereas  top-level  officials  were  given  about  C
120,000.
12.  The  relationship  between  tax-free  allowances  and  basic  salaries
may  be  expressed  as  follows:
A  - y+  3  B  (2)
vhere  A  - tax-free  allowances
B  - basic  salary
7  - total  fixed  allowances  received
6  - housing  and  bonus  allowances  expressed
as  a  fraction  of  basic  salary
For  the  calendar  year  1988,  the  values  for  7  and  6  may  be  conservatively 6
estimated  as  follows:
7  - C 18,300  (3)
6  - 0.20  (4)
The  estimate  of  I  is  based  on  the  combined  limits  of transport,  canteen
and  leave  allowances  permitted  in  1987. The  estimate  for  6  is  based  on
./  Until  December  1987,  cedi  limits  had  been  given  on  transport  and
canteen  allowances.  The  PNDC  Law  193  (Income  Tax  Amendment  Number  3,
1987)  removed  the  limits,  but  placed  a  discretionary  power  on  the
Commissioner  to  rule  out  "excessive"  allowances.
W  "Conservative"  implies  a tendency  toward  giving  low  values
compared  to  the  most  probable  outcome.-7-
housing  allowances  alone,  with  bonuses  omitted  (since  no data  are
available).
13.  With the  foregoing  result,  the  relationship  between  personal
deduction  and  total  income  may  now  be derived. Personal  deduction
consists  of two  parts: first  the  tax-free  allowances  and  second  the
standard  deduction,  which  may  be  written  as follows:
D  - A +  (5)
where  D  - total  personal  deduction
A  - tax-free  allowances
a  - standard  deduction  under  the  tax  schedule
14.  Since  total  income  is  the  sum  of  basic  salary  and  tax-free
allowances:
Y  - A +  B;  (6)
deduction  may  be expressed  in terms  of total  income:
D  t+  Y  G  (7)
where  as-  +  (y/(1+6)J
and  pG-  6(1+6)
According  to  the  tax  schedule  of 1988,  with
- 39,250
- 0.167,
the  relationship  is
D  - 39,250  +  0.167 *  Y  (8)
15.  In spite  of the  IDTDs,  the  overall  tax  schedule  is  progressive.
The  relationship  between  (total)  income  and  tax  liability  is  shown  in
Figure  2.  As income  rises,  the  tax  liability  becomes  a larger  proportion
of income. The slope  of a line  segment  connecting  the  origin  and  a  point
on the  curve  increases  with the  horizontal  distance  from  the  origin.- 8-
Figure  2
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B.  The  Case  of Nigeria
16.  Personal  deductions  under  the  Nigerian  income  tax  code  consist  of
two  components.  The  first  depends  on the  number  of dependents  in  the
household. The second  is  stated  as  a fraction  of the  taxpayer's  earned
income. Unlike  the  .ase  of  Ghana,  these  deductions  may  be claimed  by the
self  employed  and independent  professionals.
17.  These  rules  imply  the  following  relationship  between  the  level  of
personal  deduction  and income:
D-aN  PN  *  Y  (9)
vhere  D - personal  deduction
Y  - total  earned  income
aN  dependent  allowance
ON  the  fraction  of deductible  income
The  value  of Y  vary across  taxpayers  while  that  of  aN  and  PNchange
over  time.
18.  During  the  calendar  year  1987,7  the  following  tax  schedule  was
implemented:
1.  Deductions
Personal  deduction  was  set  at Naira  1,000  plus 12.5%  of earned
income. Dependent  allowances  included  N500  for  spouse,  N400  for  each
child  up to a  maximum  of four,  and  N600  for  each  dependent  relative  with
no limit  stated.
7/  The  average  official  exchange  rate  in 1987  was  N4.01  to the  US$.- 10  -
2.  Ta  Rate
Brackhet  Rate  (t)
(Taxable  income)
First  N2,000  10
Next N2,000  15
!ext N2,000  20
Next N2,000  25
Next N5,000  35
Next N5,000  40
Next  N10,000  45
Next  N10,000  50
Over  N40,000  55
19.  Thus,  for  a taxpayer  with  a spouse  and  two  dependent  children,
personal  deduction  may  be written  as:
D  - 2,300  +  0.125  *  Y  (10)
Consequently,  taxable  income  is  given  by:
I  - Y-D - -2,300 + O.875.Y  (11)
where  I  - Taxable  Income.
Like  the  case  of Ghana,  the  overall  tax  burden  is  progressive,  in spite  of
the  IDTDs,  as shown  in  Figure  3.
III.  ANALYSIS
20.  This  section  demonstrates  a transformation  of tax  systems  based  on
partial  income,  such  as that  of  Ghana  and  Nigeria,  to  one  based  on total
income. This  transformation  yields  a  new tax  structure  that  provides
considerable,  and  unexpected,  insights  into  the  use  of IDTDs. This  new
structure  also  serves  as the  correct  oasis  for  comparisons  with
conventional  tax  systems  elsewhere. 8
./  A method  for  comparing  personal  income  tax  schedules  across  countries
is given  in  Sicat  and  Virmani  (1988). The  authors  did  not  account  for
the  use  of IDTDs  among  countries  in the  sample.  however.- 11  -
Figure 3
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21.  The  following  analysis  rests  on the  realization  that  the
information  contained  in  a  personal  income  tax  schedule  may  be summarized
in  a compact  equation. This  equation  expresses  the  relationship  between  a
given  level  of income  and  the  tax  liability  implied  by the  schedule  and
may  be written  algebraically  as follows:
T  - mi *  (Y - x) - ki  (12)
where  T  - income  tax  due;
mi  - the  marginal  tax  rate  in  the  ith  bracket
to  which  Y belongs;
Y  - the  given  level  of total  income
x  - fixed  or standard  deduction
k  - a  constant  specific  to the  ith  bracket
The  values  of the  various  parametric  censtants  (mi's,  x and  ki's)  are
derived  from  the  given  tax  schedule. The  constants  ki's  represent  an
adjustment  factor  needed  to allow  for  progressivity  in the  tax  schedule  and
are  defined  as follows:
ki  - 0  for  i  - 0, 1  (13)
i-1
ki  E(mi  - m)  *  B.  for  i  > 1  (14)
where  Bi - the  size  of the  jth  tax  bracket,  with the
first  bracket  referring  to the  income  range
to  which  the  lowest  non-zero  marginal  tax
rate  applies.
22.  Consider,  for  example,  the  following  income  tax  schedule:
Tax  Rate  Bracket
Nil  First  10,000
10%  Next  10,000
20%  Next  10,000
30%  Above  30,000- 13 -
From  this  schedule,  the  following  constant  values  are  determined:
i  Xi  BL  ki
0  0  10,000  0
1  10%  10,000  0
2  20%  10,000  1,000
3  30%  N.A.  3,000
Normally,  the  last  bracket  (that  with  the  highest  marginal  tax  rate)  is
open-ended  and  therefore  infinite  in  size. The  calculation  of ki's,  as
given  in (14),  does  not  require  the  size  of the  last  bracket,  however,  and
thus  no indeterminancy  arises. For  instance,  in  the  example  above,  k3
depends  only  on Bl  and  B2 (each  equal  to 10,000)  and  not  at all  on B33
which  is  open-ended.
23.  The  fundamental  equation  (12)  is  useful  in  a  variety  of
applications.  The  principal  use in  this  section  is  to convert  the  Ghanaian
and  the  Nigerian  tax  systems  into  an  equivalent,  but  more  conventional  and
familiar  one. Another  application  is  given  in the  Annex  where  the
differences  between  tax  deductions  and  tax  credit  are  demonstrated.
A.  The  Ghanaian  Tax  Svstem
24.  According  to the  Ghanaian  tax  rules,  equation  (12) may  be
rewritten  as follows-
T  - gi . (B - s)  - ki  (15)
where  B  - basic salary
s  - standard  deduction  or  personal
relief  under  the  tax  schedule
gi  - marginal  tax  rate  applicable  to B
i-l
k  z  (gi-  ( 1 )  *  Bi  for  i  >  1
0  otherwise- 14 -
The  values  oZ g's  and  ki's  corresponding  to the  1988  tax  schedule  are
given  in  Table  1.
Table  1
Parametric  Constants
Ghanaian  Personal  Income  Taxation
Marginal  Size  of  Additive
Index  Tax  Rate (%)  Bracket  (cedi)  Constant  (cedi)
(miL)  (Bi)  (k  i)
1  5  30,000  0
2  10  30,000  1,500
3  20  225,000  7,500
4  30  225,000  36.000
5  40  225,000  87,000
6  50  225,000  160,000
7  55  N.A.  208,000
Notes:  1.  Definitions  are  given  in  the  text.
Sources: 1.  1988  Budget  Statement,  Ministry  of Finance
2.  Staff  calculations
25.  To compare  the  Ghanaian  tax  schedule  to that  of  other  countries,  it
is  desirable  to convert  the  tax  base  from  basic  salary  to gross  salary
inclusive  of all  allowances.  The  conversion  is aided  by the  relation:
B  - -[ 7(1 + 6) ]  +  [l/(l  + 6)]  *  Y  (16)
Upon substitution  of B from  (19)  ,  equation  (18)  becomes:
T - Igi/(1  + 6)] *  [Y  - - s  * (1  + 6)]  - ki  (17)
Equation  (17)  deserves  a  closer  look  as it turns  out  to  be of  critical
importance.  Note  in  particular  that  equation  (17)  shows  exactly  the  same
relationship  between  tax  liability  and  gross  income  as in equation  (12),
with  the  following  notationa'l  changes:- 15 -
m  g1/(l  +  6)  (18)
x  - +  s  (1  + 6)  (19)
i-l
ki  jE 1 [(gi-gj)/(l  +  6)] . Bj(l  +6)  (20)
This  correspondence  suggests  that  the  Ghanaian  tax  system  is equivalent  to
a conventional  tax  system  (based  on gross  income  and  standard  deductions)
with  mazginal  tax  rates  given  by identity  (18),  standard  deduction  as in
(19) and  tax  brackets  as in (20).
26.  Table  2 lays  out  the  full  equivalent  tax  schedule. The  conversion
is  based  on the  following  relation  between  tax-free  allowances  and  basic
salaries:
A  - 18,300 +  0.2.B  (21)
It is  evident  that  the  converted  structure  is  considerably  more  generous
than  what is  suggested  by the  existing  schedule. The  standard  deduction  of
the  converted  schedule  is  much  larger,  the  brackets  wider  and  the  marginal
rates  lower. In  particular,  the  top  marginal  rate  is  45.8%,  compared  to
the  55%  in  the  existing  schedule. The two  structures  are  presented
diagrammatically  in  Figure  4.  The  differences  between  the  two  would  be
more  pronounced  if the  coefficient  cf B in (21)  were raised,  as  with an
inclusion  of  bonuses  in  the  tax-free  allowances.
27.  The  equivalence  of the  two  tax  schedules  is  demonstrated  in
Table  3.  Two  alternative  ways  of calculating  a taxpayer's  liabilities  are
given. The  existing  method  based  on  basic  salary  is shown  on the  left,
while  the  alternative  method  based  on gross  income  and  the  converted  tax
schedule  is  shown  on the  right. The  resulting  tax  liabilities  are
identical.- 16 -
Table 2
Existing Ghanaian Tax Structule and its Eguivalent
Existing Tax  Equivalent Tax
Schedule  Schedule
(Based  on Partial Income)  (Based  on Total Income)
Tax Rate  Bracket  Tax Rate  Bracket
(%)  (cedi)  (%)  (cedi)
Nil  First 24,000  Nil  47,100
5  Next  30,000  4.167  36,000
10  Next  30,000  8.333  36,000
20  Next 225,000  16.667  270,000
30  Next 225,000  25.000  270,000
40  Next 225,000  33.333  270,000
50  Next 225,000  41.667  270,000
55  Over 984,000  45.833  over 1,199,100
Table 3
Ghana:  Alternative Income-Tax Calculations
Taxpayer's Basic Salary - C 300,000
Tax-Free Allowances  - C 78,000
Total Income  - C 378,300
Tax Calculation
Existing Systema  Converted Systemb
Bracket  Rate  Tax  Bracket  Rate  Tax
24,000  0.0  0  47,000  0.0  0
30,000  0.05  1,500  36,000  4.167  1,500
30,000  0.10  3,000  36,000  8.333  3,000
216.000  0.20  43.200  259,200  16.667  43.200
Total  300.000  47.700  378.300  47.700
Notes:  a.  Based on basic salaries
b.  Based on total income.- 17  -
Figure  4
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B.  The  Nigerian  Tax  System
28.  The  Nigerian  tax  is  based  on taxable  income,  according  to the
relation:
T  -n.  I - ki  (22)
where  I  - taxable  income
n  marginal  tax  rates  applicable  I.
Moreover,  from  equation  (11)  above,
I - Y - D  -a  N +  (1  pN)  (23)
Combining  equations  (22) and  (23)  gives:
T  - n  i[ (1-N)  Y - aN  - kl  (24)
The  values  of the  parametric  constants  corresponding  to the  1987  tax
schedule  are  as follows:
aN  - 2,300  for  a family  of four;
j6N  - 0.125
and  the  n  's  and  k 's are  given  in  Table  4.
29.  Like  the  Ghanaian  tax  system,  Nigeria's  can  also  be converted  to an
equivalent  system  based  on total  (or  gross)  income. The  conversion  rests
on the  observation  that  equation  (24)  may  be rewritten  as:
T  - ni(l-'N) . [Y - (Y(l-fi)]
i-l
-E1(1-N)(n  -n  *  Bi /(1 PN)  (25)
Equation  (25)  is equivalent  to equation  (12) with  the  following  change  of
notation:
mi  n-  (26)
x  N /(1  a)  (27)- 19  -
Table  4
Paametric  Constants
Nigerian  Personal  Income  Taxation  (1987)
Marginal  Size  of  Additive
Iaidex  Tax  Rate (%)  Bracket  Constant
(Nair&)  (Naira)
(mi)  (Bi)  (ki)
1  10  2,000  0
2  15  2,000  100
3  20  2,000  300
4  25  2,000  600
5  30  2,000  1,000
6  35  5,000  1,500
7  40  5,000  2,250
a  45  10,000  3,250
9  50  10,000  4,750
10  55  N.A.  6,750
Notes: 1.  Definitions  of constants  are  given  in  the  text.
2.  Deductions  are  N1000  plus  12.5  of earned  income  for  the
taxpayer; N 500  for  spouse;  N400  for  each  child  and
and  N600  for  each  dependent  relative.
Sources: 1.  Federal  Inland  Revenue  Department,  Lagos.
2.  Staff  Calculations.
30.  The  resulting  equivalent  tax  structures  are shown  in  Table  5  and in
Figure  5.  Compared  to the  existing  tax  schedule,  the  converted  schedule
shows: (a)  larger  tax  brackets;  (b)  lower  marginal  tax  rates;  (e)  more
liberal  deductions.  The  equivalence  of the  two  tax  schedules  is  confirmed
by the  illustrative  calculations  given  in  Table  6.- 20 -
`kble 5
lNigeria: ComRarison of Alternative TAX Schedules
(1987)
1987 Tax  Equivalent Tax
Schedule  Schedule
(Based on Taxable Income)  (Based  on Total Income)
Tax Rat2  Bracket  Tax late  Bracket
(%)  (Naira)  (%)  (Naira)
Nil  First  2,300  Nil  First  2628.6
10  Nert  2,000  8.75  Next  2285.7
15  Next  2,000  13.125  Next  2285.7
20  Next  2,000  17.500  Next  2285.7
25  Next  2,000  21.875  Next  2285.7
30  Next  2,000  26,250  Next  2285.7
35  Next  5,000  30.625  Next  5'714.3
40  Next  5,000  35.000  Next  5714.3
45  Next  10,000  39.375  Next 11,428.6
50  Next  10,000  43.750  Next 11,428.6
55  Over  42,300  48.125  over 48,342.9
Table 6
Nigeria:  Alternative Methods of Income Tax Calculation
Taxpayer's earned income  - N 10,000
Dependent allowances  - N  2,300
Relief for earned income  - N  1.250
Taxable Income  - N  6,450
Actual  Method  Equivalent  Method
(Based on Taxable Income)  (Based on Total Income)
Bracket  Rate  Tax  Bracket  Rate  Tax
2,000  0.10  200.0  2285.7  0.0875  200.0
2,000  0.15  300.0  2285.7  0.1313  300.0
2,000  0.20  400.0  2285.7  0.1750  400.0
450  0.25  112.5  514.3  0.2188  112.5
Total  6.450  1012.5  10,000  1012.5- 21  -
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IV.  A MORE  GENERAL  FOENULATION
31.  So far  deductions  have  been  expressed  as a simple  linear  function
of income. Such  a function  might  be regarded  as an  approximation  or a
least-square  fit  to  a more  general  relationship.  In some  cases,  however,  a
simple  linear  function  is  not  an  adequate  representation  of the  tax  rules,
and  a different  formulation  is  needed. A case  in  point  is  Nigeria's  1988
tax  schedule,  which  differs  considerably  from  the  1987  schedule  considered
above. When the  relationship  between  deductions  and  income  is  general  and
possibly  non-linear  two  questions  arise:
(i)  What  are the  conditions  for  ensuring  that  the  tax  system  is
progressive?
(ii) Can  the  tax  system  be represented  by an equivalent  conventional
schedule?
32.  Progressivity.  A conventional  tax  system  is  progressive  when the
proportion  of tax  liability  to income  rises  with income. Progressivity  is
generally  achieved  by the  use  of multiple  and  increasing  marginal  tax
rates. A minimum  of two  marginal  tax  rates  is required,  involving  a zero
rate (as  applied  to  personal  relief  and  other  allowances)  and  a positive
rate.  In  practice,  however,  most  tax  systems  apply  a large  number  of
marginal  tax  rates,  with  four  or five  rates  being  fairly  common.
33.  Progressivity  (as  measured  by the  rate  of increase  in the
tax-income  ratio)  is  relatively  sharp  before  the  top  marginal  tax  rate  is
reached. Beyond  that  point,  the  same  marginal  tax  rate  applies  throughout,
and  the  tax-income  ratio  changes  very  gradually.  At very  high income
levels,  the  average  tax  rate  approaches  the  marginal  tax  rate  and  the  two
become  virtually  indistinguishable.- 23 -
34.  The  conditions  for  progressivity  may  be stated  as follows:
(a)  (dT/dY) >  0;  (28a)
(b)  (d 2 T;(dY) 2 )  >  or  - 0  (28b)
where,  as  before,  T  - tax  liability
Y  - total  income
Consider  a general  deduction  function:
D  - f(Y)
where  D  - tax  deduction
f  - a twice  differentiable,  but  otherwise
unrestricted  non-linear  function.
From  equation  (12)  above,  tax  liabilities  may  be written  as:
T  - mi  (Y  - f(Y))  - ki  (29)
where mr  - marginal  tax  rate  applicable  to  Y
and  ki  - a constant  determined  by the  tax
schedule.
Thus,  progressivity  requires  that:
from  (28a)  (dT/dY) - mi (1 - f  )  >  0
or  f'  <  1;  (30a)
and from  (28b)  (d 2T/(dY) 2 - -f"  >  0
or  f  '  <  0  (30b)
where  f'  - first  derivative  of function  f
f  - second  derivative
35.  The first  condition  states  that  the  increase  in  deduction  cannot
exceed  the  increase  in income. While  true,  it is  nonetheless  a trivial
requirement  as few  would  allow  a  provision  that  fails  this  test. The
second  condition  provides  more  insight;  it  states  that  the  slope  of the- 24 -
deduction  function  should  be constant  or falling  (29b). In other  words,  to
allow  progressivity,  deductions  must  be a  constant  or declining  proportion
of income. Figure  6 shows  three  general  classes  of functions  and  their
consistency  with  progressivity.  The tax  system  loses  progressivity  only
when the  deduction  function  is  strictly  convex  or quasi-convex  (with  a line
segment  connecting  two  points  on the  curve  lying  entirely  above  or on the
curve).
36.  Representation.  The  analysis  in  Section  III  shows  that  a tax
system  with IDTDs  can  be represented  by a conventional  tax  schedule,  as
long  as the  deduction  function  is linear. When  the  deduction  function
takes  on a  general  form,  however,  there  is  no guarantee  that  such
representation  is  possible. Consider  equation  (29)  above:
T  - mi  (Y -f(Y))  - ki
Marginal  tax  rates  for  the  system  are  given  by:
gdT/dY) - mi  * (1  - f'(Y))  (31)
which  is in general  a function  of  Y.  To each  real  number  Y corresponds  a
unique  marginal  tax  rate  which  depends  on Y.  Since  there  are infinite
values  for  Y, the  marginal  tax  rates  also  take  on infinite  values. It is
therefore  not  possible  to represent  such  a tax  system  with  a standard
schedule.
37.  There  is,  however,  a class  of functions  that  is  more general  than
the  straight  lines  and  admits  a conventional  representation.  It is  the
class  of  piecewise  linear  quasi-concave  functions,  as shown  in  Figure  7,
which  consist  of two  or  more line  segments. Piecewise  linear  deduction




cwimw  ui  hugdvd
- otC  e  11  upwip- 26  -
Flaurs 7
A Piecewise  Linear  Deductio  Fuwcton






D  4040  0.225  Y
0  20  ~~40  60  80  100
Total  income  (Y) (Thousands)- 27 -
to  a ceiling. (An  example  is given  below) When the  deduction  function  is
piecewise  linear,  equation  (29)  may  be written  as:
T  - mi (Y  - fj (Y))  - kij  (32)
where  fj  - the  jth  linear  deduction  function  within
the  ith  bracket.
Marginal  tax  rates  are  given  by:
(dT/dY) - mi (1-aj  )  (33)
where  - f'j.  a constant  since  fj is linear.
From  (33),  it is  clear  that  the  number  of marginal  tax  rate  for  the  system
is  at the  most:
r  _  q *  n
where  q  - number  of  original  tax  rates;
n  - number  of segments  in  the  deduction  function;
r  - number  of  new  tax  rates,
which  is finite. Representation  by a conventional  tax  schedule  is  therefore
possible.
38.  The 1988  Nigerian  Tax  Schedule. The  rates  and  brackets  of  the  1987
schedule,  as shown  in Section  II  above,  were  retained  in 1988,  but two
changes  in  deductions  were introduced.  First,  the  transport  allowance  was
raised  from  N600  to  N1740  per  annum. This  change  would  merely  shift  the
deduction  schedule,  as shown  in Figure  I,  upward. Second,  the  houising
allowance  was  now  stated  as 20%  of  basic  salary,  subject  to  a ceiling  of
N5064. This  new  rule  added  a new  line  segment  to the  origin  schedule,  as
well  as shifted  it  upward.
39.  In  practice,  the  components  of compensation--basic  salary,  tax-free
pay  and  allowance--are  set  independently.  But  there  is regularity  in  the- 28  -
proportions  of these  components.  The  basic  salary  is the  largest  item;
tax-free  pay ranges  from  one  half to  one  quarter  of the  basic  salary,  while
the  combined  allowances  may  vary from  50%  to 100%  of  basic  salary. For
simplicity,  the  following  analysis  will  assume  that,  for  the  relevant  range
of income,  the  housing  allowance  represents  10%  of total  income,  subject  to
the  stipulated  ceiling.
40.  With the  above  assumption,  the  deduction  function  may  be  written  as:
D  - 4040 +  0.225Y  for Y <  N50,640
D  - 9104 +  0.125Y  for Y  >  N50,640
where  the  coefficient  of  Y  is  the  sum  of  housing  allowance  (10%)
and income  relief  (12.5%).  Of course,  the  percentage  housing
allowance  becomes  a flat  allowance  as income  reaches  N50,640.
This  deduction  function  generates  a quasi-convex,  piece-wise  linear  schedule
as given  in  Figure  7  above.
41.  To convert  the  tax  system  to  a more  conventional  one,  the  following
changes  are  needed:
x  (standard  deduction) - 4040/0.775 - 5212.9
mi (marginal  tax  rate) - ni *0.775
B (tax  brackets)  - /0.775
for  income  below  N50,640.- 29 -
Table  7
Nigeria: 1988  Actual  and  Equivalent  Tax  Schedules
1988  Tax  Equivalent
Schedule  Tax  Schedule
(Base:  Taxable  Income)  (Base:  Total  Income)
Tax  Rate  B  Bracket
(%)  (Naira)  (%)  (Naira)
Nil  First 4,040  A/  Nil  First  5,212.9
10  Next  2,000  7.75  Next  2,580.6
15  Next  2,000  11.625  Next  2,580.6
20  Next  2,000  15.5  Next  2,580.6
25  Next  2,000  19.375  Next  2,580.6
30  Next  2,000  23.25  Next  2,580.6
35  Next  5,000  27.125  Next  6,451.6
40  Next  5,000  31.00  Next  6,451.6
45  Next  10,000  34.875  Next  12,903.2
50  Next  10,000  38.75  Next  12,903.2
55  Over  44,040  42.625  Next  6,717.7  kt
48.125  Over  50,640.0
Notes:
a.  Includes  personal  deduction  (NI,000),  spouse  allowance  (N500),  two
children  (N800)  and  transport  allowance  (N1740).
b.  Beyond  this  point,  thet  second  part  of the  deduction  rule  applies  with
the  housing  allowance  fixed  at N5064  per  annum.
For  the  rest  of the  taxpayers:
x  - 9104/0.875  - 10,404.6
m-  n * 0.875
i
B  BN/0.875
Table  7 compares  the  1988  tax  schedule  to the  equivalent  conventional  one.
Note  that  the  ceiling  on housing  allowance  takes  effect  only  in the  top
income  tax  bracket;  all  other  taxpayers  are  entitled  to the  proportional
deduction.- 30 -
V.  CONCLUSIONS
42.  At first  sight,  it  seems  dubious  to let  tax  deduction  increase  with
the  taxpayer's  income. Such  a practice  appears  to  give  larger  tax  breaks  to
the  rich  than  the  poor. Upon  a close  examination,  however,  this  notion
turns  out  to  be false. As the  preceding  analysis  shows,  each  tax  system
with income-dependent  tax  deductions  is fully  equivalent  to a  particular
conventional  tax  system  with standard  deductions. 9
43.  Consider  a given  conventional  tax  schedule  that  has  standard
deductions  and  progressive  tax  rates. Suppose  to  this  system  a  new rule  is
added  that  provides  an  additi..al  deduction  equal  to 10%  of the  taxpayer's
income. This  single  reform  measure  has  the  same  effects  as a
"liberalization"  package  consisting  of: (a)  an increase  of about  10%  in
standard  deductions;  (b)  an enlargement  of  about  10%  in  all  tax  brackets;
(c)  a reduction  of about  10%  on all  marginal  tax  rates. The  full
equivalence  of the  two  options  may  not  be obvious  to all  observers;  at least
it  was  not to  the  authors.
44.  An implication  of the  finding  is  that  a tax  system  with  IDTDs  is  not
less  equitable  than  a conventional  one  with STDs. They  are  in fact
equivalent.  Note in  particular  that  a liberalization  package  of the  above
variety  has  been  the  main features  of tax  reforms  across  countries  in the
1980s. Equity  has  not  emerged  as a  major  issue  in  these  efforts. An
equivalent  tax  reform  option  consisting  of an IDTD  rule,  therefore,  should
not  be a cause  for  particular  concern.  Observe,  moreover,  that  removing  an
IDTD  rule  already  in  use  and introducing  a liberalization  package  at the
i/ Except  when the  deduction  function  is  non-linear  with  strictly  non-zero
second  derivatives,  (as  discussed  in Sectio.i  IV). Such  a function  has
not  been found  in  practice,  however;  the  existing  ones  are  either  linear
or  piecewise-linear,  with  conventional  representation.- 31 -
same  time  would  leave  the  tax  system  effectively  unchanged,  although  on the
surface  the  two  sets  of tax  rules  may  appear  to  be  very different.
45.  The  equivalence  between  an IDTD  and  a "liberalization"  package  as
mentioned  above  also  raises  a further  policy  question. Should  a country
contemplating  a tax  reform  to liberalize  the  tax  schedule  simply  adopt  an
IDTD? There  is  no immediate  or unconditional  answer. Although  an IDTD is
an administratively  simple  procedure,  its  logic  is  not  immediately
transparent.  It  could  be misinterpreted  and  regarded  as inequitable.
Moreover,  it  could  be misused. The  fixed  percentage  deduction  could  be
relaxed,  resulting  in  an  unrestricted  deduction  as  with the  case  of canteen
and  transport  allowances  in  Ghana. In  addition,  the  IDTD  could  be confined
to  one  segment  of taxpayers,  resulting  in  a true  inequity,  as  with  the
discrimination  against  the  self-employed  in  Ghana. These  caveats  concerning
IDTDs  do not  provide  adequate  justifications  for  replacing  an existing  IDTD
by an equivalent  liberalization  package,  however. A taxpaying  public  long
accustomed  to income-determined  allowances  may  vigorously  oppose  such  a
change. Even  in  an imperfect  system  such  as that  of Ghana,  it  may still  be
strategically  preferable  to  correct  the  aberrations,  rather  than  eliminating
the  IDTDs  and risking  a tax  revolt.
46.  The  finding  also  has implications  for  comparative  tax  research.
When  a country  uses  IDTDs,  its  tax  schedule  should  not  be compared  directly
to  a conventional  tax  schedule  in  another  country. Existing  work  dealing
with  cross-country  comparisons  of tax  deductions  and  marginal  tax  rates
generally  fails  to account  for  this  important  feature. As the  analysis
above  makes  clear,  the  presence  of IDTDs  invalidates  a straightforward
comparison.  A transformation  as suggested  above  is  needed  to  put an IDTD
system  on a comparable  basis  with  a conventional  tax  schedule.- 32 -
AN-u
Tax  Deductions  vs.  Tax  Credit
For  a system  relying  on tax  deductions,  tax  liabilities  may  be
expressed,  as in (12):
T  - mi '  (Y  -x)  - ki
Consider  an increase  in  personal  deduction,  x,  which  might  occur  annually.
An increase  in  deduction  reduces  tax  liabilities  as follows:
dT  - - mi . dx
Tax  saving  to  a taxDayer  is thus  equal  to the  product  of  his  marginal  tax
rate  and  the  increase  in deduction.  Clearly,  a taxpayer  with  high income
receives  a larger  tax  saving  than  one  with  low  income.
Under  a tax  system  with tax  credit  instead  of deductions,  the
relationship  (12)  is  modified  somewhat:
T  - mi *  Y - c - ki
where  c  - a  specified  tax  credit.
An increase  in tax  credit  gives  rise  to  the  following  change  in  tax
liabilities:
dT  - -dc
Thus,  regardless  of income  and  marginal  tax  rates,  tax  saving  is  equal  to
the  increase  in tax  credit. There  is  no  variation  across  taxpayers.  A
numerical  illustration  of this  point  is  given  in  Table  Al.- 33 -
Table  Al
Standard  Deduction  vs.  Tax  Credit
I. Increase  in  Deduction
Before  After
Mr.  Green  Mr.  Brown  Mr.  Green  Mr.  Brown
1.  Gross  Income  20,000  40,000  20,000  40,000
2.  Tax  1,000  6,000  800  5,400
3.  Tax  Saying  200  600
(Before-After)
II.  Increase  in  Tax  Gregt
Before  After
Mr.  Green  Mr.  Brown  Mr.  Green  Mr. Brown
4.  Gross  Income  20,000  40,000  20,000  40,000
5. Tax  2,000  7,000  2,000  7,000
6.  Tax  Credit  1,000  1,000  1,200  1,200
7. Net  Tax  1,000  6,000  800  5,800
(5-6)
8.  Tax  Saving  200  200
(Before-After)
Assumptions
Standard  Deduction  Tax  Credit
Tax  Rate  Brackets  Brackets  Tax  Rate  Brackets  Brackets
(Before)  (After)  (Credit-1000)  (Creditm1200)
Nil  First  10,000  First  12,000
10%  Next  10,000  Next  10,000  10%  First  20,000  First  20,000
20%  Next  10,000  Next  10,000  20%  Next  10,000  Next  10,000
30%  above  30,000  above  30,000  30%  above  30,000  above  30,000- 34 -
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